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Existing research suggests that in acquisitions of small technology based firms by large 
established firms, post merger integration both enables and hinders acquirer’s efforts to 
leverage the technology of acquired firms. This apparent paradox can be resolved once we 
account for the qualitatively distinct ways in which acquirers leverage technology 
acquisitions. Integration helps acquirers use the acquired firm’s existing knowledge as an 
input to their own innovation processes (leveraging what they know), but hinders their 
reliance on the acquired firm as an independent source of ongoing innovation (leveraging 
what they do). We also show that experienced acquirers are better able to mitigate the 
disruptive consequences of the loss of autonomy entailed by integration, though we find no 
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Acquisitions of small technology based firms are an important source of technological 
inputs for established firms in high velocity industries (Leonard-Barton, 1995; McEvily, 
Eisenhardt and Prescott, 2004). A growing body of research on such “technology 
acquisitions” points to an underlying paradox: post-merger integration both enables and 
hinders acquirer’s efforts to leverage the technology of acquired firms (Birkinshaw, 1999; 
Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Puranam, Singh and Zollo, 2006; Ranft and 
Lord, 2002). This is because organizational integration mechanisms can enhance knowledge 
transfer and coordination between acquirer and acquired organizations, but can also 
significantly disrupt organizational processes in the acquired firm due to the reduction in its 
organizational autonomy (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In an attempt to understand this 
paradoxical impact of integration on coordination and autonomy, some scholars have relied 
on detailed qualitative data to uncover the multiple consequences of post merger integration. 
They have also identified integration mechanisms (such as the retention of key employees and 
the creation of channels for rich communication) and integration strategies (such as 
integrating different parts of the acquired company to different degrees) that promote 
knowledge flows and coordination without generating significant disruptive effects through 
the loss of autonomy (Graebner, 2004; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Schweizer, 2005).  
In this study, we propose an alternative approach to understanding the integration 
paradox based on distinguishing two distinct ways in which acquirers leverage technology 
acquisitions.  We argue that when acquirers use the acquired firm’s existing knowledge as an 
input to their own innovation processes, they are primarily leveraging what the acquired firm 
“knows”. In contrast, when acquirers rely on the acquired firm as an independent source of 
ongoing innovation, they are primarily leveraging what the acquired firm “does”. We argue 
that post-merger integration helps acquirers leverage what the acquired firm “knows” by 
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promoting coordination between acquirer and target firm, but hinders their ability to leverage 
what the acquired firm “does” because of the disruptive effects on the target organization 
caused by a reduction in autonomy. Thus, we propose that the effect of post-merger 
integration in technology acquisitions becomes more transparent and less paradoxical once we 
account for the qualitatively distinct ways in which acquirers can leverage technology 
acquisitions. In doing so, we shift the emphasis from integration mechanisms, to the impact of 
integration strategies (broadly defined) on different kinds of post-acquisition outcomes.  
We focus on two archetypes of post-acquisition organizational integration - structural 
integration, and its converse, structural separation. These correspond to situations in which 
the acquired firm is completely integrated into the acquirer and loses its distinctive identity as 
an organizational unit, or it is preserved as a distinct organizational entity within the merged 
firm (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). We use patenting data to decompose the acquirer’s 
innovation efforts after acquisition into leveraging what the acquired firm knows and what the 
acquired firm does (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Almeida, 1996; Almeida, Song and Grant, 2002; 
Ernst and Vitt, 2000).  
We develop theoretical arguments for the impact of structural integration on the mix 
autonomy and coordination that characterizes the post-acquisition organization, and the 
consequences for the resulting mix on different kinds of technology leverage. Consistent with 
our predictions, we find that structural integration enhances the acquirer’s ability to leverage 
the existing knowledge base of acquired firms. However, structural integration detracts from 
the acquirer’s ability to leverage the capability of the acquired firm for further invention. We 
also analyze the extent to which acquisition experience (Zollo and Singh, 2004) helps 
acquirers avoid this stark tradeoff between leveraging knowledge and leveraging capability. 
We find that that experienced acquirers are better able to mitigate the disruptive consequences 
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of the loss of autonomy entailed by integration, though we find no evidence that they achieve 
greater coordination benefits from integration.  
The results of this study contribute to our understanding of technology acquisitions in 
particular and to post-merger integration in general (Birkinshaw, Bresman and Hakanson, 
2000; Capron, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Ranft and 
Lord, 2002; Shanley, 1994). However, we also believe that this study has broader 
implications for understanding how firms acquire and integrate knowledge based inputs from 
external sources. The distinction between knowledge (“what they know”) and capability 
(“what they do”) is well established in the strategy literature (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; 
Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 
1997; Winter, 1987). Yet, this theoretically meaningful distinction plays a limited role in the 
literature on technology sourcing relationships such as partnerships, joint ventures and 
acquisitions. Our analysis shows that new insights can be gained by being precise about 
exactly what is being leveraged in such relationships. In particular, our results suggest that 
organizational arrangements necessary to leverage knowledge may be fundamentally 
incompatible with those necessary to leverage capabilities, though greater experience may 
help mitigate this trade-off to some extent.   
TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITIONS: PRIOR LITERATURE 
Small technology based firms are attractive to acquirers as sources of technological 
inputs in regimes of rapid technological change (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; 
Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990). Acquiring such firms allows acquirers to avoid the time 
consuming, path dependent and uncertain processes of internally accumulating technological 
resources – the knowledge and intellectual property that underlie technologies (Dierickx and 
Cool, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Steensma and Fairbank, 1999). In addition, acquisitions of 
small technology based firms may also provide acquirers with an opportunity to acquire an 
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organizational unit that is capable of producing further innovations. The acquired unit then 
functions effectively as a bundle of individual and organizational capabilities that generates   
further innovations. Acquirers can “graft” the resulting innovation streams onto their own 
organization (Huber, 1991; Puranam, 2001), and exploit the fruits of the acquired firms 
inventive efforts by linking them to their own complementary assets in manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution (Doz, 1988; Teece, 1986; Williamson, 1975, 1985).  
The management of technology acquisitions is however far from simple; although 
they provide quick access to technologies and innovation streams, problems of 
implementation frequently compromise them. Consistent with the view of acquisitions in 
general having disappointing performance (see King, Dalton, Daily and Covin, 2004 for a 
recent meta-analysis), both anecdotal and research evidence suggests that even technology 
acquisitions are prone to high failure rates (Chaudhuri and Tabrizi, 1999; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002; Steensma and Corley, 2000) i.  
The conflicting demands of autonomy and coordination are often suggested to 
underlie implementation difficulties in technology acquisitions (Birkinshaw, 1999; Chaudhuri 
and Tabrizi, 1999; Graebner, 2004; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Puranam et al, 2006; 
Ranft and Lord, 2002). For instance, integration mechanisms identified in the literature on 
organization design such as the homogenization of organizational processes across acquirer 
and acquired firm, the rotation of R&D personnel, and joint product development activities 
can in principle help acquirers leverage the acquired firm’s technology and innovation 
capability through enhanced coordination between them (Galbraith, 1974; Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Nadler and Tushman, 1998). However, such mechanisms may also harm efforts 
to leverage technology, because they impinge on the organizational autonomy of the acquired 
firm, thereby disrupting existing organizational routines and lowering extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivation (Benner and Tushman, 2003; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Wageman, 1995). 
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Indeed, the few existing large sample studies on the performance effects of such integration 
mechanisms in technology acquisitions report mixed results (Chakrabarti, Hauschildt, and 
Suverkrup, 1994; Gerpott, 1995; Ranft, 1997), consistent with the observation that integration 
enhances coordination at the expense of autonomy.ii  
One approach to understanding the paradoxical nature of post-merger integration in 
technology acquisitions has been to rely on fine-grained qualitative data. Ranft and Lord 
(2002) build on seven detailed case studies of technology acquisitions to induce propositions 
about integration and performance. Consistent with the notion of the integration paradox, they 
argue that autonomy for acquired firms (in terms of formal administrative structure and 
culture) simultaneously preserves tacit and socially embedded technologies and capabilities, 
but impedes acquirer’s efforts to leverage them, because autonomy limits effective 
coordination. However, rich unstructured communication, in the form of frequent face-to-face 
interactions avoids the disruptive consequences of administrative and cultural integration 
while also enabling high levels of coordination. It therefore facilitates both the preservation as 
well as the leverage by the acquirer of the acquired firms technology and capabilities.  
Graebner (2004) uses case data on eight technology acquisitions to focus on the role 
played by leaders of the acquired firm in post-merger integration. She finds that acquired 
leaders can moderate the effects of integration on performance; they may simultaneously 
enable greater integration and coordination and mitigate its disruptive consequences 
stemming from the resulting loss of autonomy due to their superior knowledge of and 
influence over the acquired organization. Graebner also finds that acquired leaders can help to 
discover serendipitous sources of value in the acquisition if they hold positions that straddle 
the acquired and acquiring organizations. Schweizer (2005) draws on five case studies of 
acquisitions of biotechnology companies by large pharmaceutical companies to argue for the 
value of hybrid integration strategies- that integrate different parts of the acquired firms value 
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chain to different degrees. He suggests that by providing autonomy to upstream R&D units 
while integrating downstream non-R&D activities like sales and regulatory approval, 
acquirers can meet both short-term goals of adding to their pipeline, while also preserving the 
target’s capabilities at generating innovation for the future. 
While qualitative analysis enriches our understanding of the working of integration 
mechanisms at a fine grained level, we believe that an equally valid and complementary 
approach lies in analysing technology leveraging outcomes at a more fine-grained level. To 
better understand exactly what acquirers leverage in technology acquisitions, we draw on the 
distinction between the knowledge that underlies a technology, and the capability to produce 
new technologies. The stock of technological knowledge in an acquired firm at the time of 
acquisition includes knowledge embodied in artifacts as well as embedded in the minds of 
individuals that pertains to existing technologies (Winter, 1987). In contrast, the capability to 
generate further innovations is primarily resident in individual and group processes that allow 
for the recombination of existing knowledge into new knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 
1996). The distinction between knowledge and capability has been extensively discussed in 
both theoretical and empirical contributions to the strategy literature (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000; Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 1987; Zollo and Winter, 
2002).  
Prior research on technology acquisitions has been largely agnostic to the distinction 
between knowledge and capability leverage by the acquirer. This is true not only of studies 
that have focused on the link between post-merger integration and performance (eg. 
Chakrabarti et al, 1994; Gerpott, 1995) but also of studies that focus only on innovation 
outcomes. For instance, Ahuja and Katila (2001) show that on average, the impact of 
technologically motivated acquisitions on the innovative performance of the combined firms 
(measured through patenting) is positive, but they do not distinguish between patenting that 
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arises from leveraging the existing knowledge of the acquired firm and from leveraging its 
capabilities for ongoing innovation. Ernst and Vitt (2001) also aim to explore the effects of 
acquisition on innovativeness, but focus only on the number and quality of the patents filed 
post-acquisition by highly productive (pre-acquisition) inventors. In their sample, acquirers 
appear to have failed to fully leverage the capabilities for innovation embodied in the key 
inventors of the acquired firm, but their analysis does not take into account the leveraging of 
existing knowledge by acquirers as an alternate source of value creation. 
Why does the distinction between leveraging existing knowledge (“what they know”) 
vs. capabilities for ongoing innovation (“what they do”) matter in technology acquisitions? In 
the following section, we introduce a theoretical framework that suggests that the distinction 
between existing knowledge and innovative capabilities is important because their leverage 
requires distinct organizational arrangements. We argue that knowledge leverage strategies 
emphasize coordination over autonomy, whereas in capability leverage the emphasis shifts to 
autonomy over coordination. We thus offer a fresh perspective on the integration paradox by 
highlighting the different effects of post-merger integration on attempts to leverage existing 
technological knowledge vs. innovation capabilities in technology acquisitions. 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Organizational antecedents of Knowledge and Capability Leverage 
 
What acquirers leverage – the existing knowledge or innovative capability of the 
acquired firm- has implications for the division of labour and organization of innovative 
activity after the acquisition. For instance, consider the case when a firm may seek primarily 
to transfer and integrate the acquired firm’s existing knowledge with their own. The 
employees of the acquired firm would then be engaged primarily in imparting their 
knowledge – “what they know”- to the employees of the acquiring firm who would then 
   
 9
leverage this knowledge into innovative activity. Alternately, consider the situation in which 
the acquirer may rely on the acquired firm’s capabilities primarily to generate innovations that 
they can utilize. For instance, the technical personnel of the acquired firm may continue to do 
“what they do” - produce inventions - that are then commercialized by the acquirer, which 
would correspond to the acquirer leveraging the innovative capabilities of the acquired firm. 
The extent to which the employees of the acquirer and target firm need to work closely 
together is much larger in the first (knowledge leverage) case than the second (capability 
leverage).  
It is generally accepted that in technology acquisitions organizational autonomy 
minimizes disruption in the target firm, therefore preserving motivation and capacity for 
ongoing innovative activity by the target firm employees (Birkinshaw 1999; Ranft and Lord, 
2002; Graebner, 2004; Schweiger, 2005). The additional point we wish to highlight however 
is that the extent of coordination required between acquiring and acquired units depends on 
what the acquirer wants to leverage from the acquisition. When the goal is primarily to 
leverage the existing knowledge of the target firm by transferring it to the acquirer’s 
personnel, than the need for coordination dominates the need for autonomy. In contrast, when 
the primary goal is to keep the acquired employees capable of producing ongoing innovation, 
then the need to preserve autonomy dominates the need for coordination between acquirer and 
target firm.  
We represent these arguments graphically in Figure 1. Points below the diagonal 
represent an emphasis on autonomy over coordination, whereas points above the diagonal 
represent an emphasis on coordination over autonomy. The area below the diagonal can 
therefore be thought of as the “zone of capability leverage”, whereas that above the diagonal 
is the “zone of knowledge leverage”. We note that the distinction between the zones is a 
matter of emphasis – the zone of capability leverage also entails some degree of coordination 
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between acquirer and target organization, just as the zone of knowledge leverage also entails 
some degree of organizational autonomy. Put differently, the marginal rate of technical 
substitution between coordination and autonomy is different for capability and knowledge 
leverage, though both coordination and autonomy may be complements in either kind of 
leverage.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Our arguments about the distinct organizational antecedents of knowledge and 
capability leverage are an elaboration of a more general point first made by Haspeslagh and 
Jemison (1991). These authors argued that acquisition integration strategies are conditional on 
the extent of strategic interdependence between acquirer and target, and the need for 
organizational autonomy of the target firm., and suggested four generic integration strategies 
that arise from crossing these two dimensions.  Their argument implicitly ascribes a single 
objective to the acquisition, which determines the level of interdependence and autonomy. We 
suggest that within the context of technology acquisitions, there may exist different objectives 
for the same acquisition (i.e. knowledge and capability leverage), which require distinct 
organizational antecedents.  
 
Structural Form, Knowledge and Capability Leverage 
 
In acquisitions, the choice between structural integration and its converse structural 
separation is a fundamental design choice about the form of the combined organization 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). As a formal design choice concerning the “grouping” of 
organizational units, structural integration precedes decisions about the use of “linking” 
mechanisms between organizational units (such as the alignment and standardization of 
processes and systems, common hierarchical control, cross-unit teams and integrating 
managers) both temporally and in importance (Galbraith, 1977; Nadler and Tushman, 1998; 
Thompson, 1967). Scholars who study acquisition implementation describe the choice 
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between complete absorption and preservation of autonomous organizational status as an 
important initial decision that shapes further fine-grained integration actions (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Pablo, 1994; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Zollo and Singh, 2004). 
Structural integration enhances the acquirer’s efforts to leverage the technical 
knowledge embedded in the human capital of acquired firm employees. By grouping 
organizational units together within administrative boundaries through structural integration, 
the coordination mechanisms of programming, hierarchy and feedback can be effectively used 
to enable knowledge transfer and coordination (Galbraith, 1977; March and Simon, 1958; 
Thompson, 1967). For instance, structural integration will typically result in common 
procedures, common goals, and common authority between acquired and acquiring firm’s 
technical employees, which enhances coordination and knowledge sharing between them 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). In addition to the impact on the formal systems and 
procedures of the organization, structural form also shapes the emergence of informal 
organizational processes that aid knowledge transfer, such as the creation of common 
knowledge, informal communication channels and group identity (Camerer and Knez, 1996; 
Ibarra, 1993; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Krackhardt, 1990; Moran and Ghoshal, 1996). These 
effects may be strengthened if structural integration also results in collocation. Structural 
integration may also be conducive to the leverage of knowledge that is embodied in physical 
artefacts. Administrative integration can enable superior access to the knowledge embodied in 
documents, equipment and procedures because of enhanced awareness of the existence and 
location of these knowledge resources, as well as control over their use (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison, 1991; Zollo, 1998). We refer collectively to these consequences of structural 
integration as the “coordination effect” – as cumulatively they serve to enhance coordination 
between the acquirer and target firm. 
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 Thus, structural integration, through the coordination effect is expected to create 
organizational conditions that enable acquirers to successfully leverage what the acquired firm 
knows- the existing knowledge base of the acquired firm. This is because knowledge leverage 
relies primarily on enhanced coordination between acquirer and target firms, which structural 
integration promotes. We therefore predict: 
H1: Structural integration is positively associated with acquirer’s success at 
leveraging the existing knowledge of acquired firms in technology acquisitions. 
In addition to the coordination effect, however, structural integration can impede the 
acquirer’s efforts to leverage the acquired firm’s capabilities for innovation because it ends 
the autonomous existence of the target firm. This “loss of autonomy” effect reduces the 
capacity of the inventors within the target firm to continue doing innovative work in two 
different ways. First, since integration implies a standardization of work practices and 
procedures between the target and acquirer firm, the work practices in the target firm must 
undergo change. Change can cause disruption, independent of any improvements brought 
about by a new configuration of organizational attributes (Amburgey, Kelley, and Barnett, 
1993; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Such changes can alter organizational routines within the 
acquired firm, and in doing so can undermine its innovative capabilities (though as we have 
noted, integration may promote coordination between the acquirer and target organizations) 
(Benner and Tushman, 2003; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Ranft and Lord, 2002). These effects go 
beyond the short-term disruption of productivity, to describe a long-term reduction in the 
innovative capability of the target firm. 
Second, there is the possibility of lowered motivation and productivity of inventors I 
the target firm after being structurally integrated. Arguments from agency theory suggest that 
structural integration weakens the link between reward and effort. Free riding increases as 
formerly distinct organizational units are grouped together, and precludes the use of sharper 
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incentives (Baker, 2002). Talented employees with hard-to-measure skills and efforts are 
often attracted to smaller organizations because of their ability to offer high-powered 
incentives (Zenger, 1994). Such employees are likely to become demotivated, and could 
possibly even leave after their firm has been fully integrated into the acquirer, which would 
critically undermine the target firm’s innovation capacity (Ernst and Vitt, 2000). Lowered 
intrinsic motivation due to lowered task autonomy following structural integration can lead to 
similar results (Osterloh & Frey, 2000; Wageman, 1995). These adverse consequences for 
motivation can significantly and permanently damage innovation capabilities in acquired 
firms.  
Thus structural integration may enhance the linkages between the acquired and 
acquiring units through the coordination effect, but may prevent acquirers from being able to 
successfully leverage the capabilities of the acquired firm employees for ongoing innovation- 
because of the “loss of autonomy” effect (and consequent long-term disruptions). Put 
differently, structural integration may enhance the acquirer’s ability to leverage what the 
target firm employees “know”, but may impede their efforts to leverage what they “do”.  
H2: Structural integration is negatively associated with the acquirer’s success at 
leveraging the innovative capabilities of acquired firms in technology acquisitions. 
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of how structural integration forces a transition 
from the zone of capability leverage to the zone of knowledge leverage, by changing the mix 
of coordination and autonomy. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
The Moderating Effects of Acquisition Experience  
Experiential learning is a fundamental mechanism through which limitedly rational 
individuals come to grips with complexity (Cyert and March, 1963). The extensive literature 
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on the learning curve in manufacturing processes (eg.Yelle, 1979; Epple, Argote and Devdas, 
1991) has documented this mechanism on shop floors. Recent research suggests its existence 
in corporate boardrooms as well; experience effects have been studied for infrequent, high 
impact events such as contracting, alliances and acquisitions (Mayer and Argyres, 2004; Kale, 
Dyer and Singh, 2002; Zollo and Singh,2004).  
It would however be fair to say that prior empirical work on the effect of acquisition 
experience on acquisition performance has been inconclusive. Some empirical tests have 
shown a positive effect of experience on performance (Fowler and Schmidt, 1989; Bruton, 
Oviatt and White, 1994), while others have shown non-significant effects (Lubatkin, 1987; 
Baum and Ginsberg, 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004). A few studies have found a ‘U-shaped’ 
effect for acquisition experience on performance (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999), which 
other studies have however failed to replicate (Hayward, 2002).   
One important explanation of these inconclusive findings is that the value of 
experience is contingent on the integration strategy- not accounting for the latter (which is 
typically the case in most prior studies) may partly explain the absence of reliable results for 
experience effects. Popular accounts of highly successful acquirers such as Banc One (Winter 
and Szulanski, 2001) and Cisco Systems (Business Week, September 1999; Fortune, 
November 8, 1999) do suggest that acquisition experience impacts focal acquisition 
performance at least partly through building expertise of the acquirer in post-acquisition 
management. Consistent with this view, Zollo and Reuer (2005) find that firms with greater 
acquisition experience are able to derive superior performance when they manage the focal 
acquisition with greater levels of integration. We extend this line of thinking by examining 
how acquisition experience may influence the coordination and loss of autonomy effects 
generated by structural integration. 
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In analyzing the influence of experience on the effects of structural integration, it is 
useful to distinguish between the process by which structural integration is achieved – the set 
of short term changes that must be accomplished to create an integrated organization- from 
the longer term effects of the final integrated organizational form. Acquisition experience may 
undoubtedly be useful in managing the logistics of the transition to an integrated 
organizational form, as this transition involves a complex set of interrelated and time-bound 
decisions spanning multiple organizational sub-units (Zollo and Singh, 2004). However, these 
short-term benefits that accrue during the integration period are not our focus. Both the 
coordination and loss of autonomy effects we described are the long term consequences of a 
realized structurally integrated organizational form.  
To understand how experience influences the coordination and loss of autonomy 
effects of structural integration amounts to asking if (and why) these effects differ across 
firms with different experience levels, even when all chose structural integration. Put 
differently, our focus is on how experiential learning can help acquirers strengthen the 
coordination effect or weaken the loss of autonomy effect, rather than how they can transition 
to a structurally integrated form more efficiently. We expect that through experience, 
acquirers learn how to better manage the consequences of structural integration. Structural 
integration is a change to the formal organization design resulting in changes to reporting 
relationship, incentives, and operating procedures across acquiring and acquired 
organizations. However, the effectiveness of these changes across acquirers may differ as a 
function of their prior experience with managing acquisitions.  
Through experiential learning, acquirers may be able to develop competence at 
leveraging the new formal organizational arrangements more effectively to enhance 
coordination – the same standards and procedures may yield superior coordination benefits to 
experienced users (Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2001). Experienced acquirers may also be able to 
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influence the emergent aspects of coordination following structural integration- such as the 
creation of group norms, identity, and common knowledge- through more sophisticated 
interventions than those used by relatively inexperienced acquirers (Stahl and Voigt, 2004). 
Experience may also help to mitigate the disruptive consequences of structural integration. 
Repeat acquirers may develop capabilities at minimizing the adverse motivational 
consequences of structural integration through better communication programs, which explain 
the rationale for the changes and minimize ambiguity about the future fate of acquired firm 
employees.  They may also develop capabilities at targeted retention efforts – at identifying 
the key individuals whose departure or demotivation would be most disruptive, as well as at 
designing retention packages that are likely to be most effective for such individuals.   
In sum, we expect acquisition experience to enhance the implementation of structural 
integration by strengthening the coordination effect as well as weakening the disruptive 
consequences of the loss of autonomy effect. Hence, we test the following hypotheses:  
H3: The relationship between structural integration and knowledge leverage is 
positively moderated by acquirer acquisition experience.   
H4: The relationship between structural integration and capability leverage is 
positively moderated by acquirer acquisition experience.   
 
METHODS 
Sample and Data 
In keeping with prior literature, we define technology acquisitions as the acquisition of 
small technology based firms by large established firms to gain access to their technology and 
capabilities (Doz, 1988; Graebner, 2004; Granstrand and Sjolander, 1990; Ranft and Lord, 
2002). We chose acquisitions from the information technology (computing and 
communications) and pharmaceutical industries for two reasons: First, these sectors are 
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frequently profiled in popular publications as being extremely active in acquisitions aimed at 
accessing the technology expertise of smaller companies (Business Week, September 1999; 
Fortune, November 8, 1999). Second, both these industries are characterized by 
appropriability regimes that encourage significant patenting activity (Cohen, Nelson, and 
Walsh, 2000; Klevorick et al, 1995; Levin et al, 1987). 
Acquiring firms were selected from SIC codes of manufacturing industries connected 
to computing, communications and to pharmaceuticals. We used the U.S. Small Business 
Administration definition of small businesses (< 500 employees) to distinguish large acquirers 
from small target firms. Our criteria for selecting established acquirers required them to have 
been listed continuously in COMPUSTAT between 1988-1998 and to have had more than 500 
employees at every point in time in the study. The choice of the time window was driven by 
the availability of good public information on acquisitions and ex-post performance measures 
(the data were collected in 2001). Continued existence during the study-window 
operationalized our definition of established firms.iii We identified the technology acquisitions 
made by these firms through SDC Platinum’s M&A Database. These were acquisitions of 
independent firms (as opposed to divestments) that had less than 500 employees at the time of 
the acquisition, and had filed at least one patent prior to acquisition. Similar criteria and 
techniques have been used to identify technology based entrepreneurial firms and acquisitions 
in the literature (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Granstrand and Sjolander, 
1990). These screening criteria resulted in 103 acquisitions by 51 acquirers. Data limitations 
reduced this to 97 acquisitions by 49 acquirers. 
Our decision to include only those acquired firm firms that had filed at least one patent 
prior to acquisition is similar to sampling decisions in other studies using citation and inventor 
productivity data; the sample only contains firms that have produced patents prior to the study 
period (Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003 and references there-in). While 
   
 18
this does raise potential sample selection concerns, we believe this is an acceptable price to 
pay for the reliability and ease of availability of patenting data and the insights it offers on 
inventive activity. Further, we are primarily theorizing about the leveraging of acquired 
technology, and patenting is a fairly reliable indicator in the selected industries that the 
acquired firm has some technology worth leveraging.  
Variable Definitions and Measures 
Acquirer’s Success at Knowledge and Capability Leverage: One of the novel features of this 
study is our ability to differentiate between acquirer’s success at leveraging the existing 
knowledge base of the acquired firm and it’s capability for further innovation based on patent 
data.  Hence, we describe and theoretically justify our measures for knowledge and capability 
leverage at some length in this section.  
A patent is the grant of a property right to an inventor for an invention. The patents 
assigned to a firm represent the knowledge that a firm is acknowledged as having created 
(Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson, 1993).  In this sense, the patents filed by the acquired firm 
prior to acquisition are a measure of the knowledge stock of the acquired firm. The patents 
filed by acquirers after the acquisition represent additional stocks of knowledge created 
through successful inventive activity after the acquisition (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994). In keeping with prior studies, we use a count of patents filed 
after the acquisition by the acquirer-acquired firm combination as a measure of the successful 
leveraging of technology acquisitions (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Ernst and Vitt, 2000). 
However, we introduce two critical refinements by focusing exactly on those patents after 
acquisition that involve either the leveraging of the acquired firm firm’s pre-existing 
knowledge, its innovation capabilities, or both, and distinguishing between these categories.  
In order to track the successful leverage of the acquired firm’s knowledge base by 
acquirers, we rely on patent citations. A newly patented invention typically builds on the 
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knowledge created by the firm in the past or by other firms that have preceded it in that line of 
inquiry. These prior patents are cited in the focal patent as recognition of the contribution to 
the knowledge embodied in the focal patent.  Patent citations have been used as a measure of 
knowledge building within firms and across firms (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf 
and Nerkar, 2001). Several studies using patent and citation data argue that citations are 
evidence of inter-firm and intra-firm knowledge transfer (Almeida et al., 2002; Rosenkopf 
and Almeida, 2003; Song, Almeida and Wu, 2003). This is because a citation implies 
‘material influence’ on the current patent and assumes successful transfer of tacit knowledge, 
apart from the knowledge codified in the patent itself (Almeida and Kogut, 1997, 1999; 
Almeida et al., 2002; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996; Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and Fogarty, 2002; Jaffe 
et al., 1993; Song et al., 2003). Hence, we propose that post-acquisition, an acquirer’s patent 
citing a acquired firm patent is evidence of inventive effort that leverages the acquired firm’s 
existing knowledge codified in the patent and other secondary sources as well as the tacit 
component resident in the acquired firm firm’s employees.   
To track the leverage of innovation capabilities, we rely on patent authorship data. It is 
uncontroversial to state that a patent’s author contributed in a non-trivial manner to the 
innovation embodied in the patent. The authors of a patent are referred to as the “inventors”. 
Studies of innovation frequently use patent authorship as a measure of productivity of 
engineers and scientists (Almeida et al, 2002; Song et al, 2003; Ernst and Vitt, 2000; Nerkar, 
2003). We argue that when an inventor previously employed by the acquired firm is the 
author of a patent filed by the acquirer subsequent to the acquisition, the acquirer firm has 
leveraged the innovative capabilities of the acquired firm, both as an individual and in 
conjunction with her colleagues. Through a process of exhaustive search and matching on 
surnames, initials, technology classes and location, we could construct measures of capability 
leverage by tracking patents files by target firm inventors after the acquisition.   
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Figure 3 illustrates how we measure the success of knowledge and capability leverage. 
We started by identifying the acquired firm firm’s active knowledge base prior to the 
acquisition- all patents (and inventors therein) that were filed in the three years preceding 
acquisition. Three years appeared to be a reasonable window, given the typically young age of 
entrepreneurial firms, as well as the possibility of inventor mobility between firms through 
job changes.iv We then tracked down new patents filed by the acquirer/acquired firm 
combination after the acquisition, and linked them back to the active knowledge base of the 
acquired firm prior to acquisition. All such new post-acquisition patents were placed in one of 
the four cells in Figure 3.  
The patents in cell A are a measure of both successful knowledge leverage and 
capability leverage, since these patents both cite a previous acquired firm patent and at least 
one acquired firm inventor is among the authors of these patents.  The number of patents in 
cell B is used as a measure of the success of “pure” knowledge leverage activity. These 
patents cite patents that were previously filed by the acquired firm, thus acknowledging that 
the innovation embodied in the focal patent utilizes the knowledge previously created by the 
acquired firm. However, no acquired firm employee is an author of the focal patent, implying 
that no significant utilization of acquired firm employee’s innovative capabilities occurred in 
the focal innovation. The patents in cell C are a measure of the success of “pure” innovation 
capability leverage. These patents include at least one acquired firm employee as an author, 
thus acknowledging those employees’ contributions to the innovation in the focal patent.  
However, no acquired firm patent is cited signifying that the focal patent does not build on the 
codified knowledge base of the acquired firm represented by its stock of patents. While cells 
B and C represent “pure” forms of knowledge and capability leverage, it also appears 
reasonable to count patents in Cell A in both categories- i.e. patents in cells A and B represent 
the leverage of existing knowledge, while those in cells A and C represent the leverage of 
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innovation capabilities. Our analysis results in qualitatively identical results with either 
measure. 
We deem post-acquisition patents that are not linked by citation or authorship to the 
acquired firm firm’s patents prior to acquisition as irrelevant to the study (cell D). Even if a 
potential recombination of ideas between acquirers and acquired firms took place that resulted 
in such a patent, it was minor enough not to warrant either authorship or citation of acquired 
firm knowledge.  
Structural integration: To record the structural integration decision for each acquisition, we 
examined the CORPTECH database in the year after the acquisition. CORPTECH conducts 
an annual survey of technology firms and units within firms that maintain independent P&L 
accounts, or distinct status as operating entities. The continued appearance of the acquired 
firm in the CORPTECH database published in the second year after the acquisition was 
interpreted to mean that structural integration had not been carried out. If the firm disappeared 
from CORPTECH, we interpreted this to mean that structural integration had occurred so that 
it was no longer traceable as a distinct organizational entity or maintained separate P&L 
accounts. 
As a check on the validity of the measurement of structural integration, we examined 
press releases and articles (obtained through Dow Jones Interactive and Lexis-Nexis) in a time 
window spanning one month before and after the date of announcement to obtain information 
on the proposed organizational status of the acquired firm after acquisition. Such 
announcements often contain a statement about whether the acquired firm would function as a 
distinct operational unit after the acquisition (e.g., would function as a “wholly owned 
subsidiary” or a  “separate unit”) or would be merged into one of the business units of the 
acquiring firms. If an explicit mention was made of retaining the acquired firm as a distinct 
entity, we recorded this as instance of structural autonomy, else as structural integration. We 
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conducted a text search on each set of press releases and articles (typically, about 6-7 per 
transaction) for the words “unit” or “subsidiary,” examined the context in which these words 
were used, and entered the appropriate code. An independent coder replicated the codings for 
50% of the sample, and achieved about 90% agreement on coding.  We also note that after 
two years less than 10% of acquired firms underwent a change in their integration status, 
which gives us confidence that the integration decision announced at the time of the 
acquisition was implemented in practice.   
Acquirer acquisition experience: While our study window began in 1988, we measured 
acquisition experience as a count of prior acquisitions conducted by the acquirer from the 
earliest date for which SDC data is available (1984).   
Acquired firm size and age: We obtained the number of employees in the acquired firm, and 
its age at the time of acquisition from CORPTECH and SDC Platinum. Age and size of 
acquired firms may influence their innovation outcomes and also how they are managed (in 
terms of organizational autonomy) by acquirers (Ranft and Lord, 2002). 
Acquired firm Current Knowledge Base: We measured the size of the current knowledge base 
of the acquired firm by the number of patents granted to the acquired firm in the past three 
years before the acquisition. Since these patents form the basis on which we identify future 
post-acquisition inventive activity, their number can be expected to critically influence 
observed patenting outcomes.   
Acquired firm pre-citations and prior-stock of patents:  We measured the quality of the 
acquired firm in two ways. First, we measured the number of citations (“pre-citations”) the 
acquired firm’s patents received prior to acquisition by all firms (including the acquirer firm). 
Citations received by a patent are regarded as a measure of the quality of the patent 
(Trajtenberg, 1990). We included only the citations prior to acquisitions for two reasons.  
First, we wanted to capture the quality of the acquired firm as seen by the acquirer at the time 
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of the acquisition.  Second, the act of the acquisition itself acts as a signal of quality of the 
acquired firm to the market, thus potentially inducing bias in the number of citations 
subsequently received by the acquired firm’s patents. By counting in the acquirer’s citations 
of the acquired firm’s patents prior to acquisition, we also controlled for the baseline citation 
rate by the acquirer that would have occurred independent of acquisition. However, our 
results are robust to alternate measures of quality that only count citations by firms other than 
the acquirer.  
As a second measure of acquire firm quality, we measured the prior stock of knowledge 
(“prior-stock”) in the acquired firm by the number of patents that were granted to the acquired 
firm from its inception until three years before acquisition. In conjunction with the variable 
measuring “Current knowledge base”, these variables include a comprehensive count of all 
pre-acquisition patents.  
Acquirer R&D Intensity: Investment in R&D as a percentage of sales for acquirers was 
calculated from data available from COMPUSTAT. R&D investments by acquirers could lead 
to superior innovation outcomes on their own, and could also build absorptive capacity, 
enabling successful utilization of external sources of knowledge (Ahuja and Katila, 2001; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).  
Acquirer Size: We obtained the number of employees in the acquirer at the time of acquisition 
from CORPTECH and SDC Platinum.  Acquirer size may affect retention of key inventors, 
since employees with hard to measure skills tend to self-select toward small companies 
(Zenger, 1994). 
Technological relatedness: We included a measure of technological relatedness between 
acquired firm and acquirer (Seth, 1990; Singh and Montgomery, 1987). Relatedness was 
assessed through the extent of overlap between the technology codes assigned to acquired 
firms and acquirers by SDC Platinum. This database assigns three digit technology codes to 
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acquirers and acquired firms based on the technology and product lines of the firms. The 
extent of overlap was calculated as the number of codes common to acquirer and acquired 
firm divided by the total number of technology codes of the acquired firm.  
Time: Our sample consists of acquisitions that occurred in a ten-year time window between 
1989-1998, in which an acquisition could have happened at any time.  We measure patenting 
after acquisition from the time of acquisition until 2002.  Since patents accumulate over the 
years after acquisition, we control for time elapsed after acquisition until the end of our 
observation period.   
 Model Specification and Econometric Issues 
Since our dependent variables are counts that take on non-negative integer values, using the 
Poisson model is indicated (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, 
1994). This model assumes that the number of patents filed by a firm in any given year, or the 
number of acquired firm inventors who appear on patents is a random variable that is 
approximated via a Poisson process, in which the mean is equal to the dispersion of the data. 
This implies that the probability of obtaining q counts of patents or inventors in a particular 




where l is the expected value (and the variance) of the random variable q. Poisson regressions 
estimate this parameter in log-linear models of the form  
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using the method of maximum likelihood.  Since the Poisson process models counts per unit 
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in our estimation we control for exposure time- the time period over which patenting is 
observed.   
Our data displays over-dispersion (the variance is greater than the mean) thus violating 
the Poisson distribution assumption. However, Poisson regressions have the appealing 
property that whether or not the distributional assumptions are met, the estimates of b will be 
consistent and asymptotically normal (Wooldridge, 2000: Chap. 17).  Therefore we report 
heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors for coefficients estimated through Poisson 
models, as these provide consistent estimates for the standard errors even under 
misspecification of the distribution (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001)v.  
In our setting, we believe that unobserved stable features of acquirers are an important 
aspect to be taken into account.  Differences in terms of post acquisition inventive activity 
could potentially be attributed to such stable acquirer features such as superior routines and 
incentive mechanisms, management methods and better acquired firm selection capabilities. 
With multiple acquisitions observed for each acquirer, it is possible to control for such stable 
acquirer features. With multiple acquisitions per acquirer, (2) becomes modified to  
)3....(..........)log( ' iitit x αβλ +=  
where the a term captures acquirer level heterogeneity. We can estimate (3) either via random 
or fixed effects (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). In our data, the null hypothesis of 
random effects is rejected, and so we report estimates obtained from a fixed effects Poisson 
model (Wooldridge, 2001). 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for our data are displayed in Table 1. There is considerable variance 
on the key acquirer characteristics of size, acquisition experience and R&D intensity and 
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target characteristics such as age, size, quality and previous patenting behavior.  Post 
acquisition, about 40% of the target firms were structurally integrated.  In about 44% of the 
acquisitions, no patenting activity from either knowledge or capability leverage was observed 
at the end of the observation period.   
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Examining the correlations displayed in Table 2, we note that there is only a small 
(ρ=0.27) correlation between the measures of the success of knowledge leverage and 
capability leverage.  This suggests that these measures are indeed capturing different 
conceptual entities. We also note that correlations between independent variables do not 
suggest any obvious concerns about collinearity  
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Hypothesis Testing 
The fixed-effects Poisson regression estimates for the effect of structural integration 
on different innovation activities are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  In these tables, the controls 
were entered first (Model 1), followed by structural integration (Model 2) and the interaction 
term with experience (Model 3).  In these tables, the measure of knowledge leverage includes 
all patents in which a target firm inventor appears as an author (cells A and B in Figure 3), 
while capability leverage includes all patents that cite target firm’s pre-acquisition patents 
(cells A and C in Figure 3).   
In Hypothesis 1 we predicted a positive relationship between structural integration and 
the acquirer’s success at leveraging existing knowledge from the acquired firm.  From Model 
2 in Table 3, we note that the coefficient for structural integration is positive and significant 
(p<0.10).  Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 1.  In Hypothesis 2, we predicted a negative 
relationship between structural integration and the acquirer’s success at leveraging the 
   
 27
innovation capabilities of the acquired firm. From Model 2 in Table 4 we find a negative and 
significant (p<0.05) coefficient for structural integration, supporting Hypothesis 2.   
INSERT TABLE 3 and TABLE 4 HERE  
In Hypothesis 3 we predicted that acquisition experience would positively moderate 
the effect of structural integration on knowledge leverage. From Model 3 in Table 3, we see 
that the coefficient for the interaction term is negative but not significant. We also conducted 
a joint test of significance for structural integration and the interaction term to assess if 
collinearity between these terms was suppressing a significant effect. However, we found no 
evidence for this as the coefficients are not jointly significant (χ2(2) = 3.48, p = 0.17). Hence, 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported.  In Hypothesis 4 we predicted that acquisition experience will 
positively moderate the effect of structural integration on capability leverage.  From Model 3 
in Table 4 we see that the interaction term has the expected positive sign and is significant 
(p<0.10). Hence, we find support for hypothesis 4.   
The results on the control variables emphasize the conclusion that knowledge and 
capability leverage have distinct antecedents. Knowledge leverage is enhanced by the quality 
of the acquired firm at the time of acquisition, as measured by the stock of accumulated 
patents granted prior to three years before acquisition. Capability leverage, on the other hand, 
is enhanced not by the stock of accumulated knowledge, but by the extent to which the target 
firm is active in patenting prior to the acquisition.  Capability leverage is also diminished by 
increasing target size, which is consistent with prior work on scale diseconomies in R&D 
(Zenger, 1994).    
Robustness Checks 
A number of robustness checks lend confidence about the basic validity of our results.  
A basic premise in our argument is that the coordination and autonomy effects are temporally 
stable. Thus, we assume that structural integration moves the configuration of organizational 
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attributes towards an emphasis on coordination over autonomy (Figure 2), but assume away 
the possibility that over time the disruption effects may get weaker or the coordination effects 
could get stronger. If this assumption is invalid, we could well find that over time the effects 
we found may weaken or disappear. To assess how stable the effects of structural integration 
are over time, we re-estimated the main effects models for the impact of structural integration 
in Table 3 with an interaction term between structural integration and the time period over 
which we observed patenting activity for each firm. If over time, the loss of autonomy or 
coordination effects weakened/strengthened significantly, then we would expect significant 
interaction terms. The results are reported in Table 5.   
The interaction term between time and structural integration is not significant for 
capability leverage (Model 2, Table 5), but positive and significant for knowledge leverage 
(Model 1, Table 5). We also assessed if collinearity could account for the absence of 
significant effects through joint significance tests of the main effect of structural integration 
and the interaction term with time; however we found no evidence of this.   
Thus we conclude that there is no evidence that the disruption effects arising from the 
loss of autonomy following structural integration weaken significantly over time. This is quite 
consistent with our view of the loss of autonomy effect as a long-term effect due to the 
demotivation of key inventors and the disruption of productive routines that toe them to each 
other, rather than a short period of lowered productivity after the acquisition. In contrast, we 
find that the effect of structural integration on knowledge leverage strengthens over time, 
suggesting that the coordination effect becomes even stronger over time, leading to even 
greater knowledge leverage in later periods than would be apparent from examining the 
average effect of structural integration over the entire time period (as we did in testing H1). 
Thus accounting for time-varying effects of structural integration does not alter our basic 
results and conclusions.vi 
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We also re-estimated our models with a number of alternative measures. First, we 
included alternative measures for target quality including number of citations obtained by the 
target firm’s patents from firms other than the acquirer prior to acquisition, the number of 
citations received from the acquirer prior to acquisition, and the dollar value per employee 
paid by the acquirer for the target. Our results are robust to these alternative measures of 
quality. Second, we also used measures of capability and knowledge leverage that restricted 
patent counts to only “pure” capability and knowledge leverage.  In Figure 3, this corresponds 
to excluding patents that indicated both knowledge and capability leverage (cell A) in 
measures of knowledge leverage, for instance. We obtain qualitatively similar results from 
these specifications. Third, we conducted a number of checks to identify outliers and 
influence points, including constructing “bootstrapped” standard errors and coefficients and 
examining residuals in linear versions of our specifications. We could not identify any 
individual observations that significantly altered the results. Fourth, by estimating fixed 
effects for acquirers, we are implicitly controlling for industry differences between IT and 
pharmaceuticals. However, we also assessed the extent to which our results vary across these 
two industries. We therefore constructed interaction terms with all variables in the model and 
a dummy variable for industry.  We find that there is no impact of industry on the effect of 
structural integration on knowledge or capability leverage.   
 
DISCUSSION 
 The results of this study indicate that acquirers can leverage technology acquisitions in 
two qualitatively distinct ways; they may leverage the existing knowledge of the acquired 
firm (“what they know”), and/or it’s capabilities for ongoing innovation (“what they do”). 
Structural integration has a negative impact on the acquirer’s attempts to leverage innovative 
capabilities, but has a positive impact on the leveraging of existing knowledge. Our results are 
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consistent with the theory we propose that these two leverage processes have distinct 
organizational antecedents – the optimal mix of coordination and autonomy is distinct in the 
two cases, and structural integration shifts the balance in favour of coordination over 
autonomy. We also find that the acquirer’s acquisition experience alleviates the adverse 
consequences of structural integration on the acquirer’s efforts to leverage innovation 
capabilities, but do not find any evidence that prior experience enhances efforts to leverage 
knowledge. This suggests that in terms of long-term performance consequences (rather than 
efficiency of the integration process itself) acquisition experience may primarily be useful in 
mitigating the loss of autonomy effect rather than strengthening the coordination effect. We 
discuss the implications of our results for research and practice, as well as limitations and 
scope for further research. 
Implications for Research & Practice 
 This study helps to shed new light on the integration paradox in technology 
acquisitions. Rather than focusing on the conflicting effects on all leveraging activities, we 
show that structural integration has different effects on qualitatively different forms of 
leveraging activities. These findings suggest several implications for research on technology 
acquisitions in particular, and technology sourcing relationships in general.   
First, this study suggests that organizational arrangements necessary to leverage 
existing knowledge may be incompatible with those necessary to leverage capabilities for 
ongoing innovation. Acquisition management practices that encourage innovation outcomes 
from capability leverage are likely to do so at the cost of reduced innovation from knowledge 
leverage, and vice versa. This argument is particularly clear in the case of structural 
integration, which is essentially a discrete choice about post-acquisition organizational form. 
While other formal coordination mechanisms such as process overlays, compensation systems 
and the standardization of procedures are not as discrete as structural integration choices, the 
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existence of complementarities between elements of an organizational form creates natural 
limits to the extent to which discreteness in organizational alternatives can be overcome 
(Gersick, 1991; Ghemawat and Costa, 1993; Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; Mintzberg, 1990; 
Nickerson and Zenger, 2002; Williamson, 1991). A related implication is that post acquisition 
innovative activity is likely to be dominated by whichever mode of technology leverage that 
the post acquisition organizational form supports: observed inventive activity will correspond 
primarily to capability leverage or knowledge leverage, but is unlikely to be characterized by 
balanced levels of both activities.  In our sample, we find some evidence in favour of this 
argument. We performed t-tests with the null hypothesis that the number of patents from 
capability leverage and knowledge leverage are the same in each acquisition.  The t-test 
shows that the number of patents corresponding to knowledge and capability leverage are 
different from each other on average (p<0.05).   
Our theory and analysis reflects to some extent the well-known trade-off between 
exploration and exploitation in organizational learning (March, 1991). From the acquired 
firm’s perspective, knowledge leverage may be seen primarily as an exploitation of its current 
knowledge base, whereas capability leverage involves exploration of new opportunities 
through ongoing innovation. The different organizational antecedents of exploration and 
exploitation, and the difficulties of reconciling them have been recognized in other contexts 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003; Ghemawat & Costa, 1993; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Our 
analysis can be seen as linking post-merger integration strategies to specific forms of 
exploration (capability leverage) and exploitation (knowledge leverage). This interpretation 
treats the difference between exploration and exploitation primarily in terms of the degree to 
which the use of existing knowledge vs. the pursuit of ongoing innovation is emphasized.  
However, an alternative perspective is also feasible, if exploration and exploitation are viewed 
primarily in terms of local vs. more distant search in the opportunity space. Both knowledge 
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and capability leverage can be seen as exploratory search from the perspective of the acquirer, 
as either form of leverage may generate innovations that are distinct from the acquirers 
existing technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Conversely, 
either may be exploitative if the technology trajectories of the two firms are related. Thus 
from the acquirer perspective, knowledge and capability leverage do not necessarily 
correspond to exploitation and exploration, as either form of leverage is consistent with both 
local and distant technological search (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 
2001).  
Second, our findings also indicate the important and different roles played by 
acquisition experience in influencing the coordination and the loss of autonomy effect. Our 
results suggest that experience had a positive moderation effect on the link between 
integration and capability leverage- implying that acquirers with experience can mitigate the 
disruptive consequences of the loss of autonomy resulting from structural integration. 
However, we found no moderation effects for knowledge leverage. This suggests that the 
value of experience in acquisitions arises primarily from managing the loss of autonomy 
effect, rather than enhancing the coordination effect. This also suggests a broader insight- 
experience effects may be most significant in acquisitions where autonomy preservation is 
critical, but some degree of integration is unavoidable (Zollo and Singh, 2004).   
 Third, this study points to the importance of being precise about exactly what is being 
leveraged in inter-firm technology sourcing relationships. Not only are knowledge and 
capabilities distinct conceptual entities, as widely recognized in the strategy literature, 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996; Leonard-Barton, 
1992; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 1987) their leverage is qualitatively different, and involves 
distinct organizational levers.  Leveraging existing knowledge may involve knowledgeable 
individual teaching others “what they know” – through a process of knowledge transfer or 
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capability replication (Szulanski, 1997). However, leveraging the innovative capabilities of 
individuals and teams may involve the utilization of their creative outputs as they continue to 
do “what they do” rather than having them teach their creative skills to others. This distinction 
is explicitly made in Demsetz’s discussion of learning vs. hiring (Demsetz, 1988). He argues 
that often it may not be economical or even feasible for a new individual or team of 
individuals to learn and understand a skill (“what they know”) in a timely manner; it may be 
better to hire the knowledgeable individuals in question to produce the desired results (”what 
they do”). Huber (1991) makes similar observations about the benefits of transferring 
knowledge vs. “grafting” on knowledgeable employees. Our analysis extends these theoretical 
observations by showing how the success of these different leverage mechanisms can be 
measured (through citations and authorship patterns in patenting), and also developing and 
testing a theoretical framework about their distinct and incompatible organizational 
antecedents. A related implication of our results for researchers is that they must specify 
innovation performance more accurately in empirical work on technology acquisitions, as 
lumping together inventive activity from capability leverage and knowledge leverage may not 
yield any effects for organizational variables like structural integration. The absence of effects 
may in fact disguise two offsetting effects. 
Fourth, the findings of this study also draw managerial attention to an important 
choice: managers should form clear ideas regarding whether the potential for future 
innovation from an acquisition is likely to be derived from leveraging capability or 
knowledge. Based on this decision, managers should plan their acquisition integration 
strategies accordingly to maximize the innovation returns from acquisitions.  
Limitations and Scope for Further Research 
Several limitations of this study are worth noting. Patents have both significant 
strengths and weaknesses as measures of innovative outputs, which have been extensively 
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discussed in prior literature (Caballero and Jaffe, 2002; Jaffe et al., 2002). Clearly, our study 
suffers from the same weaknesses and benefits from the same strengths as other studies that 
rely on patenting data. Of concern is the specific critique that citations are a noisy measure of 
knowledge flow, since they could also be used to delineate the rights of the present patent 
from that of other closely related patents. Citations could also be introduced by patent 
examiners, rather than by the inventors (Trajtenberg, 1990). In our setting, we expect the 
‘noisiness’ of citations is of less concern because both the citing patent and the cited patent 
belong to the same legal entity.  Hence, it is more likely that the firm would be aware of the 
existence of relevant prior art.  
Using patent data limits our ability to draw any conclusions about the eventual 
commercial success of innovations arising from acquisitions. We have therefore been careful 
to draw inferences only about the success of acquirers at leveraging the existing knowledge 
and capabilities of acquired firms, and have not discussed their success at innovation per se. 
Though patenting is an imperfect indicator of innovation in general, it does represent a fairly 
reliable indicator of efforts at innovation (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984) in industries 
with strong appropriability regimes (Klevorick et al., 1995; Teece, 1986). As regards the two 
industries that comprise our sampling frame, there is strong consensus in the literature that 
patenting is an indicator of innovations in the IT hardware and pharmaceutical industries 
(Cohen et al, 2000).  Future studies could utilize alternate measures of innovation especially 
when generalizing to industries without strong intellectual property regimes, where patents 
may not be a meaningful indicator of innovation.   
Our analysis has also been confined to studying the effect of structural integration on 
innovation outcomes conditional on acquisition, rather than the effect of acquisition on 
innovation outcomes (eg Ahuja and Katila, 2001). In future studies, it may be useful to 
analyze the effect of acquisition on the continued productivity of inventors or in the utilization 
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of their knowledge in innovation activity (eg. Ernst and Vitt, 2000). Further, we have focused 
on only one aspect of post-acquisition structural form- structural integration- whose discrete 
nature throws the trade-off between knowledge and capability leverage into sharp relief. We 
have argued that additional coordination mechanisms like process overlays and linking 
mechanisms primarily elaborate and reinforce the fundamental decision about post-
acquisition organizational structure (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991). Nonetheless, we believe 
that further research that explores the limits of using process overlays and other formal 
coordination mechanisms to compensate for the discrete nature of organizational grouping 
choices in acquisitions will prove valuable in understanding the issues in this study. 
Finally, our analysis stops short of leading to conclusions about causation. While we 
are able to control for unobserved features of acquirers (through fixed effects) that may 
induce spurious correlations between structural integration and innovation outcomes, we 
cannot econometrically rule out the possibility that other unobserved features of the 
transaction, such as the culture, structure or technological properties of the acquired firm may 
have influenced both structural integration and innovation outcomes in a manner that 
spuriously induces a correlation between the two.vii However, we feel confident about the 
basic validity of our results for two reasons. First, we believe we have controlled for plausible 
alternate explanations through control variables for the acquired firm’s age, size, pre-
acquisition technological quality, technological activity, and similarity to acquirer. We 
believe these variables should be correlated with important features of acquired firms that we 
cannot directly observe, such as culture, leadership, structure, technological properties etc. 
Second, we are comforted that our hypotheses are supported across different model 
specifications with different dependent variables (knowledge and capability leverage) and 
with moderation effects. It seems difficult to suggest a plausible alternative explanation that 
accounts coherently for all of these effects.  






We believe this study fills an important gap in the literature on inter-firm technology 
transfers, and on the use of external sources of technology by firms facing regimes of rapid 
technological change. Scholars interested in the specific mechanisms through which firms use 
acquired knowledge and capabilities have often relied on fieldwork and qualitative data 
(Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Leonard-Barton, 1992, 1995; Ranft and Lord, 
2002;Schweizer, 2005). While the richness of case data is undisputed, they typically play a 
limited role in testing rather than inducing theoretical arguments. Patenting activity provides a 
reliable if not rich record of the knowledge flows characterizing inventive activity, a feature 
that has been extensively used in studies on inter-firm technology transfer (Almeida and 
Kogut, 1999; Almeida et al., 2002). However, studies based on patent data have typically 
been agnostic to the organizational antecedents of observed patenting behaviour. Our study 
combines the analysis of inventive activity and its organizational antecedents. We thus 
contribute to the literature on how firms acquire, use and generate new knowledge by refining 
and complementing existing theory derived from case based inductive research as well as 
patent based analysis of inter-firm knowledge transfer (Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Leonard-
Barton, 1985; Ranft and Lord, 2002; Song et al., 2003). By clarifying the conceptual and 
empirical distinctions between leveraging knowledge (“what they know”) and leveraging 
capabilities (“what they do”), we hope to have helped refine future theorizing and empirical 
analysis of these important phenomena. 
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Figure 3: Measuring leverage of Innovation Capability and Existing Knowledge  
through post-acquisition patenting 
Acquired firm pre-acquisition patents are cited? PATENTS FILED BY ACQUIRER 
AFTER ACQUISITION IN WHICH Yes No 
Yes 
Capability and  
Knowledge Leverage (A) 
 
Only Capability 
leverage (C) Acquired firm inventor(s) are 
authors? 
No Only Knowledge leverage (B) Irrelevant (D) 
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TABLE 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Measurement Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Structural Integration Dummy coded 1 if structurally 
integrated 
97 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Acquirer Size  Log of acquirer sales 97 6.41 2.51 2.01 10.67 
Acquirer R&D intensity (%) Acquirer R&D budget as a fraction 
of acquirer sales 
97 11.03 5.19 0 33.3 
Acquirer acquisition 
experience 
Number of firms the acquirer had 
bought prior to focal acquisition 
97 6.88 6.17 0 26 
Acquirer Employees Number of employees in acquirer 
at time of acquisition 
97 37252 40573 748 156373 
Technology Relatedness Normalized measure of the number 
of shared technology codes 
97 0.31 0.41 0 1 
Acquired firm age Number of years from founding 
until acquisition 
97 11.67 11.12 0 88 
Acquired firm size  Number of target employees at 
time of acquisition 
97 132.2 110.7 3 500 
Acquired firm Pre-citations  Number of citations received by 
target patents prior to acquisition 
97 9.5 19.4 0 103 
Acquired firm Prior-stock of 
patents 
Number of patents filed by target 
until three years prior to acquisition 
97 9.8 21.9 0 182 
Acquired firm current 
innovativeness 
Number of patents filed by target 
in the three years prior to 
acquisition 
97 4.9 6.5 1 47 
Capability leverage  Patents filed by acquirer or target 
after acquisition in which at least 
one target inventor is an author.   
97 2.9 5.3 0 34 
Knowledge leverage  Patents filed by acquirer or target 
after acquisition in which at least 
one target patent is cited.   
97 3.1 6.4 0 38 
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TABLE 2. – Correlation Table 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 14 
1 Structural Integration 1.00             
2 Acquirer Size 0.05 1.00            
3 Acquirer R&D intensity -0.11 0.01 1.00           
4 Acquirer Employees  -0.07 0.20** -0.16 1.00          
5 Acquirer acquisition experience 0.15 0.22** 0.28*** 0.10 1.00         
6 Technology Relatedness -0.01 -0.05 0.08 0.12 0.15 1.00        
7 Acquired firm age 0.03 -0.18* -0.13 0.05 -0.13 -0.11 1.00       
8 Acquired firm size 0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.01 -0.13 0.12 0.26*** 1.00      
9  Acquired firm Pre-citations 0.14 0.02 0.35*** -0.10 0.20** 0.27 -0.08 0.13 1.00     
10 
Acquired firm current 
innovativeness -0.11 -0.14 0.27*** 0.06 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.45*** 1.00    
11 
Acquired firm Prior-stock of 
patents 0.08 0.06 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 -0.02 0.15 0.03 0.40*** 1.00   
12 Capability leverage -0.19* -0.23** 0.31*** 0.02 0.00 0.06 -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.34*** 0.22** 1.00  
13 Knowledge leverage -0.07 0.09 0.15 -0.17 0.24** 0.10 -0.15 -0.11 0.30*** 0.06 0.04 0.27*** 1.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 3. – Impact of Structural Integration on Knowledge Leverage - Poisson fixed effects 
models with robust standard errors 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Acquirer Acquisition Experience -0.05 -0.08 -0.02 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) 
Structural Integration  0.57* 1.37* 
  (0.35) (0.81) 
Experience * Structural Integration   -0.07 
   (0.06) 
Acquirer Size -0.11 -0.14 -0.26 
 (0.46) (0.42) (0.44) 
Acquirer R&D intensity 0.01 0.02 0.01 
 (0.1) (0.11) (0.11) 
Acquirer number of Employees -8.4 e-6 1.6 e-5 -2.5 e-5 
 (3.8 e-5) (3.5 e-5) (3.8 e-5) 
Technological overlap 0.24 0.27 0.39 
 (0.48) (0.53) (0.55) 
Acquired firm Age -0.08* -0.07** -0.09** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Acquired firm number of employees -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Acquired firm pre-citations 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Acquired firm current innovativeness 0.08 0.09 0.10 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Acquired firm prior-stock of patents 0.03 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Time Exposure Exposure Exposure 
N 97 97 97 
LL -109.9 -106.3 -103.8 
Wald χ2 115.05*** 111.06*** 117.2*** 
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TABLE 3. – Impact of Structural Integration on Capability Leverage  - Poisson fixed effects 
models with robust standard errors 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Acquirer Acquisition Experience -0.01 -0.001 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
Structural Integration  -0.53** -2.29** 
  (0.22) (1.08) 
Experience * Structural Integration   0.13* 
   (0.07) 
Acquirer Size 0.02 0.04 0.02 
 (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) 
Acquirer R&D intensity 0.08 0.05 0.04 
 (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
Acquirer number of Employees 4.2 e-6 8.5 e-6 1.4 e-5 
 (2.3 e-5) (2.4 e-5) (2.4 e-5) 
Technological overlap 0.44 0.45 0.49 
 (0.5) (0.49) (0.62) 
Acquired firm Age -0.01 -0.006 -0.008 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Acquired firm number of employees -0.003 -0.004* -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Acquired firm pre-citations -0.002 -4.2 e-4 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) 
Acquired firm current innovativeness 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Acquired firm prior-stock of patents -0.001 -0.002 -5.5 e-4 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Time Exposure Exposure Exposure 
N 97 97 97 
LL -124.03 -120 -113.8 
Wald χ2 74.03*** 77.7*** 80*** 
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TABLE 5. – The impact of Time on Knowledge and Capability Leverage – Poisson fixed effects 
models with robust standard errors 
 
 Knowledge Leverage Capability Leverage 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Structural Integration 0.62 -0.67** 
 (0.41) (0.30) 
Time since acquisition -0.19 -0.14 
 (0.17) (0.16) 
Time * Structural Integration 0.36**  -0.29  
 (0.15) (0.27) 
Acquirer Size -0.10 0.15 
 (0.35) (0.34) 
Acquirer R&D Intensity 0.03 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.07) 
Acquirer number of employees -1.0 e-5 1.9 e-5 
 (3.5 e-5) (2.9 e-5) 
Acquirer Acquisition Experience -0.12 -0.10 
 (0.13) (0.10) 
Technology Overlap 0.43 0.34 
 (0.52) (0.39) 
Target Age -0.09** -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) 
Target Employees 7.7 e-4 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Target firm pre-citations 0.01 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
Target current inventiveness 0.13 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.02) 
Target prior stock of patents 0.02 0.001 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
Time Exposure Exposure 
N 97 97 
LL -98.29 -115.1 
Wald χ2 118.5*** 77.6*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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iA Price Waterhouse Coopers report released in 1999 estimated that about 80% of 
technologically motivated acquisitions in the time period of 1994-1997 have failed to achieve 
their objectives. A study by the Hay group of Philadelphia in the same period found that as 
many as 60% of such acquisitions suffer from severe problems in the post-merger integration 
stage.  
ii It is worth noting that in the broader context of horizontal acquisitions, Capron (1999) found 
that while attempts to transfer resources from the acquired firm to the acquirer improve the 
acquirer’s innovative capabilities, they also impair acquisition performance at the same time. 
iii We note that this does not create a serious “survivor bias”, because we are not attempting to 
estimate the impact of an acquisition on the performance of the average acquirer, but rather 
the impact of management practice (i.e. structural form decisions) on the innovation 
performance of a small technology based firm acquired by a larger, established firm. 
iv Our discussions with industry experts suggest that high turnover is common among 
technical personnel in both these industries, possibly higher in IT than in pharmaceuticals.  
v Another option is to use the negative binomial model, which assumes that the distribution 
underlying the process follows the negative binomial distribution. However, if the underlying 
true distribution is not negative binomial, these models produce inconsistent coefficient 
estimates (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001).  We analysed our data with both Poisson and negative 
binomial models.  We find a large difference in the estimates of the coefficients and the 
remarkable difference in goodness-of-fit between the Poisson and negative binomial models.  
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=====================================================================================================================================================
The far superior goodness-of-fit achieved by the Poisson models convinced us that the 
underlying distribution is not negative binomial, and that the use of the latter would result in 
inconsistent estimation. 
vi We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this analysis. 
vii Accounting for such unobservable transaction features through Heckman- style 
endogeneity corrections requires the availability of a good instrumental variable; we could not 
find a satisfactory one in our data. In addition, this approach is computationally very 
complicated for exponential models such as Poisson regressions (Wooldridge, 2001). 
